What Makes Developing Asia Resilient in a Financially Globalized World? by Ito, Hiro et al.
Portland State University
PDXScholar
Economics Faculty Publications and Presentations Economics
12-1-2009
What Makes Developing Asia Resilient in a Financially Globalized
World?
Hiro Ito
Portland State University, ito@pdx.edu
Juthathip Jongwanich
Asian Development Bank
Akiko Terada-Hagiwara
Asian Development Bank
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/econ_fac
Part of the Growth and Development Commons, and the International Economics Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Faculty Publications and Presentations
by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.
Citation Details
Ito, Hiro, Juthathip Jongwanich, and Akiko Terada-Hagiwara. What makes developing Asia resilient in a financially globalized world?.
No. 181. Asian Development Bank, 2009.
ADB Economics 
Working Paper Series
What Makes Developing Asia Resilient 
in a Financially Globalized World?
Hiro Ito, Juthathip Jongwanich, and Akiko Terada-Hagiwara 
No. 181  |   December 2009

ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 181
What Makes Developing Asia Resilient 
in a Financially Globalized World?
Hiro Ito, Juthathip Jongwanich, and Akiko Terada-Hagiwara 
December 2009
Juthathip Jongwanich and Akiko Terada-Hagiwara are Economists in the Macroeconomics and Finance 
Research Division, Economics and Research Department, Asian Development Bank. Hiro Ito is an 
Associate Professor at Portland State University. The authors are grateful to Jong-Wha Lee and Joseph 
E. Zveglich, Jr. for their helpful comments; Hon Cheung for providing insights on reserves in the People’s 
Republic of China; and Aleli Rosario and Nedelyn Magtibay-Ramos for superb research assistance. 
However, the authors are solely responsible for any remaining errors. This paper was prepared as a 
background paper for a theme chapter on “Managing Financial Globalization” in the Asian Development 
Outlook Update 2009, available at www.adb.org/economics. 
Asian Development Bank
6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City
1550 Metro Manila, Philippines
www.adb.org/economics
©2009 by Asian Development Bank
December 2009
ISSN 1655-5252
Publication Stock No. WPS09_______
The views expressed in this paper
are those of the author(s) and do not
necessarily reflect the views or policies
of the Asian Development Bank.
The ADB Economics Working Paper Series is a forum for stimulating discussion and 
eliciting feedback on ongoing and recently completed research and policy studies 
undertaken by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) staff, consultants, or resource 
persons. The series deals with key economic and development problems, particularly 
those facing the Asia and Pacific region; as well as conceptual, analytical, or 
methodological issues relating to project/program economic analysis, and statistical data 
and measurement. The series aims to enhance the knowledge on Asia’s development 
and policy challenges; strengthen analytical rigor and quality of ADB’s country partnership 
strategies, and its subregional and country operations; and improve the quality and 
availability of statistical data and development indicators for monitoring development 
effectiveness.  
The ADB Economics Working Paper Series is a quick-disseminating, informal publication 
whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as articles in professional 
journals or chapters in books. The series is maintained by the Economics and Research 
Department.
Contents
Abstract   v
I.  Introduction  1
II.  Financial Integration in Developing Asia: Theory and Evidence 2
 
 A.  Regional Financial Integration in Developing Asia 3
 B.  A Disaggregated Look at Capital Flows in Developing Asia 9
III. “External” versus “Internal” Factors Affecting Capital Flows 15
IV.  How Does Financial Globalization Affect Macroeconomic Performance? 17
 A. The Estimation Model 1     8
 B. Basic Regressions Results: Output Volatility with Foreign Reserves 
  as a Threshold 20
 C. Extended Analyses: Output Volatility, Financial Development,  
  and Cross-border Capital Flows  22
V.  Managing Foreign Reserves 28
 A. Recent Reserves Management in Developing Asia 29
 B. Better Reserves Management in the Future 31
VI.  Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications 32
Appendix    36
References   48

Abstract
The pullbacks of capital inflows to developing Asia following the onset of the 
global financial crisis in 2008 have brought renewed attention to the role and 
benefits of financial globalization. A number of notable distinctions between the 
current global crisis and the Asian financial crisis have become evident. Solid 
domestic institutions, especially in the financial sector; swift policy responses; 
and a sound macroeconomic environment with adequate reserves have helped 
the region to manage well the adverse impacts of the global crisis. Empirical 
analysis examining the link between capital account openness and output 
volatility reveals that a developing country with a more open capital market tends 
to experience lower output volatility, contrary to what might be expected. It is 
also found that countries can mitigate the destabilizing effect of pursuing greater 
exchange rate stability by holding a sufficiently high level of foreign reserves. 
Furthermore, if they want to reap the benefit of financial liberalization to reduce 
output volatility, highly integrated economies need to be equipped with highly 
developed financial markets, particularly of banking and stock markets.

I. Introduction
The issue of financial globalization has received much attention since the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis when the reversal of capital inflows went hand in hand with massive 
depreciation of the exchange rates and significant contraction of economic growth. It was 
revealed that financial openness could expose economies to volatile cross-border capital 
flows, including sudden stops or reversals of capital flows, thus making economies face 
boom-bust cycles (Kaminsky and Schmukler 2008).1 The debates about the benefits of 
financial globalization and cross-border capital movements have intensified, although 
empirical evidence has been mixed at best (Kose et al. 2006, Obstfeld 2008). Henry 
(2006) argues that financial integration could have a long-term effect on investment and 
output growth only when it fundamentally changes productivity growth through financial 
market development. Otherwise, the effect of financial liberalization would be short-
lived at best. Nonetheless, cross-border financial flows continue to surge, strengthening 
the interlinkages of economies and markets in both advanced and developing worlds. 
Developing Asia is no exception; the region experienced a surge in capital inflows from 
2002 through 2007, from US$45 billion to US$363 billion.
The current global financial crisis, however, has only rekindled the debate about the role 
of financial globalization. Although Asia is not the epicenter of the crisis this time, it has 
received much attention because the region has been perceived as the main contributor 
to the “global imbalances”; Asian countries have financed the profligacy of advanced 
countries, especially the United States (US), with their current account surpluses, i.e., 
excess saving, through holding a sizeable amount of international reserves. These 
countries’ financial systems have been also under critical scrutiny because, allegedly, 
they are not developed or open enough to convert domestic saving into investment needs 
within the country or the region, and instead exported liquidity abroad. 
This paper reappraises the role of financial globalization, focusing especially on its 
impact on developing Asia’s economic growth and stability. The main group of interest 
in this paper is developing Asia’s highly integrated economies, which are composed of 
12 economies.2 These economies have been the major recipients of capital flows to the 
region. Over the past two decades, nearly 90% of total regional capital inflows have been 
directed to them. In particular, they have been the dominant players in receiving foreign 
direct investment (FDI) inflows, accounting for nearly 95% of the total. In addition, these 
 For a summary on the cost and benefits of financial liberalization, refer to Henry (2006) and Kose et al. (2006).
2 The 2 highly integrated developing Asian economies are Cambodia; People’s Republic of China (PRC); Hong Kong, 
China; India; Indonesia; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; Thailand; and Viet Nam. 
12 economies account for the vast majority of developing Asia’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) and foreign trade. Therefore, a look into these selected economies will provide a 
clear picture of how the region as a whole has coped with the past and current financial 
crises.
Section II reviews how financial integration has progressed in developing Asia both 
interregionally and intraregionally. We will also look into the process of financial 
integration in the region in conjunction with other macroeconomic objectives in the context 
of the “trilemma” hypothesis. Section III discusses capital movements in the region and 
how they respond to the global financial crisis. Section IV investigates the determinants 
of capital flows, especially focusing on the relative importance of external and internal 
factors. Section V provides some empirical evidence of how the region has benefited 
from financial globalization, and what are the preconditions for the link to be materialized. 
Section VI looks briefly at how foreign reserves have been managed in the region and 
how better management of reserves could be done. The final section provides conclusion 
and policy inferences.
II. Financial Integration in Developing Asia:  
Theory and Evidence
Although most economists agree that both advanced and developing worlds have 
experienced rapid financial globalization for the last two decades, measuring the extent of 
openness toward cross-border capital flows is extremely difficult. The measure of financial 
openness can be roughly categorized into two groups, namely, “de facto” and “de jure” 
measures. The de facto measures look into the actual volume of cross-border flows of 
financial assets, and usually take the form of the sum of external assets and liabilities as 
a ratio to GDP. The de jure measures on the other hand attempt to measure regulatory 
restrictions on capital account transactions using information about regulatory restrictions 
on cross-border capital flows reported in the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) published by the International Monetary Fund 
(Chinn and Ito 2008, Kose et al. 2006). 
While the de jure measures may reflect policy makers’ intentions, de facto ones may 
represent actual cross-border capital flows. The two measures could differ from each 
other because both measures look into different aspects of financial openness. Generally, 
the de facto measure is subject to output fluctuations, while the de jure measure can be 
affected by the degree of enforcement of the controls. Obviously, these types of financial 
openness measures have their own strengths and weaknesses, so that it is difficult to 
rank them in terms of usefulness.
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We take a look at both measures to see how they affect macroeconomic performance. 
Figure 2.1 shows the de jure measure as constructed in Chinn and Ito (2008). Developing 
Asian economies seem to have retrenched their efforts of liberalizing their financial 
markets in the late 1990s, reflecting capital tightening by some of the economies in 
the region in response to the Asian financial crisis. Since the beginning of the 2000s, 
however, these economies have been steadily increasing the level of capital account 
openness. This index presents a quite different picture about the trajectory of financial 
openness in this region compared to what we can see in the de facto flows as we show 
in Figure 2.6, which we will examine in details later in this section. 
Figure 2.1: De Jure Measure of Financial Openness for Developing Asia
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
1970
Average de jure index
1975 1980 1985 19951990 2000 2005
Note:  The index ranges [-2.5, 2.6]. Higher values indicate higher degrees of financial openness. For more details on the index, refer 
to Chinn and Ito (2008).
Source:  Chinn and Ito (2008). 
A.  Regional Financial Integration in Developing Asia
While many economists have wondered why capital tends to flow “uphill”, contrary to 
theoretical predictions, from developing to industrial countries in recent years—the “Lucas 
paradox”—financial integration has also taken place within the developing world, including 
Asia. 
According to the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey published by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), which reports the volume of bilateral flows in equity and debt 
securities for the years 1997 and 2001–2007, the 10 highly integrated Asian economies 
have more than doubled their portfolio investment trade to US$3.9 trillion from 2001 to 
2007 (Figure 2.2). At the same time, the share of portfolio investments to neighboring 
countries have increased on average from about 6% to 13% of total investments, 
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suggesting that there is still room for further regional integration. Lee (2008) argues that 
the low level of regional financial integration can be explained by high bilateral exchange 
rate volatility, a low level of capital account liberalization, and underdeveloped financial 
infrastructure, particularly in debt securities in the region. 
Figure 2.2: Share of Portfolio Investments to Neighboring Countries 
(percent of total investments)
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Source:   International Monetary Fund, Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey Data,  
available: www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/datarsl.htm.
1. The “Trilemma” Hypothesis 
Financial globalization does not take place independent of other macroeconomic policy 
objectives. That is, policy makers consider the extent of financial openness in conjunction 
with two other key objectives, namely, exchange rate stability (ERS) and monetary 
independence (MI)—the so-called “trilemma” hypothesis. The hypothesis states that a 
country may simultaneously choose any two, but not all, of the following three goals: 
monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and financial integration. Based on this 
concept, policy makers must decide within the constraints of choosing two out of the 
three policy goals (Figure 2.3).
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Figure 2.3: The “Trilemma”
Closed nancial markts
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stability
Let us look into how combinations of the three policy goals have changed for the 
developing Asian economies over years. We measure the degree of achievement in 
each of the three policy goals using the indexes developed by Aizenman et al. (2008). 
The index for monetary independence is based on the annual correlation of the monthly 
interest rates between the home country and the base country. The exchange rate 
stability index is based on the annual standard deviation of monthly exchange rates 
between the home country’s currency and that of the base country. Finally, the capital 
account openness index is a composite measure encompassing the presence of multiple 
exchange rates, restrictions on current and capital account transactions, and requirements 
of the surrender of export proceeds (Chinn and Ito 2008). All indexes are normalized to 
range from 0 to 1, and higher values indicate greater use of a particular policy.3 
Figure 2.4 (a) shows interesting characteristics of the development path of international 
macroeconomic arrangements for highly integrated developing Asian countries. For these 
countries, as early as the beginning of the 1980s, the three indexes appear to cluster 
around the middle range, though for most of the time except for the Asian crisis years, 
exchange rate stability is the most pervasive policy choice. In the postcrisis years in 
the 2000s, the indexes diverged, but seem to be converging again in recent years. This 
“middle-ground” convergence or the “managed floating plus” regime (Goldstein 2002) is 
unique to highly integrated developing Asian countries and cannot be observed in other 
income or geographical groups of countries.4 For other developing countries, as can be 
 More details of these indexes are in Aizenman et al. (2008).
 To no one’s surprise, the Euro countries have experienced a divergence of the indexes (not reported): while 
the indexes for exchange rate stability and financial openness increased rapidly in the 990s, the monetary 
independence index has been trending downward since then, reflecting the currency union arrangement.
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seen in Figure 2.4(b), the three indexes for the other developing countries in Asia do 
not show a discernible trend except for exchange rate stability being usually the most 
pervasive policy and financial openness the least. 
Figure 2.4:  Capital Account Openness, Exchange Rate Stability,  
and Monetary Independence
1970 1975
(a) Highly integrated developing Asian economies
(b) Less integrated developing Asian economies
1980 1985 19951990 2000 2005 2008
1970 1975 1980 1985 19951990 2000 2005 2008
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Note:  Panel (a) includes PRC; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Korea; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; and Thailand.  
Panel (b) includes Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Fiji, Lao PDR, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, 
Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Vanuatu, and Viet Nam.
Sources: Aizenman et al. (2008) and authors’ calculation.  
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The fact that countries have adopted different combinations of two out of the three policy 
choices and altered them occasionally in response to crises or major economic events 
must indicate that each of the three policy options is a mixed bag of both merits and 
demerits for managing macroeconomic conditions.5 Greater monetary independence 
could generally lead to stable and sustainable economic growth because it allows 
monetary authorities to have autonomy over macroeconomic management. Exchange rate 
stability could bring out price stability by providing an anchor, and lessen risk premium 
by mitigating uncertainty, thereby fostering investment and international trade. However, 
greater levels of exchange rate fixity also rid policy makers of a policy choice of using 
exchange rate as a tool to absorb external shocks. Prasad (2008) argues that exchange 
rate rigidities would prevent policy makers from implementing appropriate policies 
consistent with macroeconomic reality, and could cause asset boom and bust through 
overheating of the economy. Hence, the rigidity caused by exchange rate fixity could not 
only enhance output volatility, but also cause misallocation of resources and unbalanced, 
unsustainable growth. 
Financial liberalization is probably the most contentious policy among the three in terms 
of conflicting costs and benefits. Theory predicts that more open financial markets 
can lead to economic growth through more efficient resource allocation, mitigating 
information asymmetry, enhancing and/or supplementing domestic savings, and 
transferring technological or managerial know-how (i.e., growth in total factor productivity). 
Theoretically, economies with greater financial openness should be able to stabilize 
themselves through risk sharing and portfolio diversification. However, as financial 
liberalization increased its pace over the last two decades, financial openness received 
the blame for economic instability because it could expose economies to boom and 
bust cycles. Thus, each one of the three trilemma policy choices can be a double-edged 
sword, which should be reason for the wide and mixed variety of empirical findings on the 
macroeconomic impacts of each of the three policy choices. 
2. Conditions for Countries to Benefit from Financial Globalization
When economists argue what conditions allow economies to benefit from financial 
globalization, they often refer to two hypotheses—the composition hypothesis and 
the threshold hypothesis.6 The composition hypothesis states that different types of 
capital flows can have different macroeconomic impacts. For example, long-term capital 
movements, such as FDI, tend to be more resilient to financial calamity than other forms 
of capital flows. In addition, FDI is often found to be positively associated with economic 
growth and productivity improvement (Borensztein et al. 1998, Greenaway and Kneller 
2005). 
5 Aizenman et al. (2008) have statistically shown that external shocks in the last four decades, namely, the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods system, the debt crisis of 982, and the Asian crisis of 997/998, caused structural breaks in 
the trilemma configurations.
6 These two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. Wei (2006) presents a hybrid view that countries with better 
public institutions are likely to attract more FDI than other forms of capital flows, especially bank loans.
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The threshold hypothesis postulates that a country needs to have certain minimum 
conditions to reap the benefits of financial globalization. These conditions include financial 
market development, institutional development, better governance, trade integration, and 
macroeconomic disciplines (Chinn and Ito 2006, Kose et al. 2006 and 2009). Kose et al. 
(2009) find that the level of domestic financial development greatly affects the extent to 
which a country could benefit from financial globalization. Generally, it has been argued 
that a country needs to be equipped with a higher level of financial development than a 
threshold so that it can reap the benefits of financial liberalization and reduce the risks of 
volatile capital flows.7
3. International Reserves Holding in Developing Asia— 
 Lubricant of Financial Globalization?
In recent years, especially since the aftermath of the Asian crisis, international reserves 
accumulation has received much attention among both academics and policy practitioners 
simply because it can affect a country’s vulnerability to external shocks. The role of 
international reserves holding can be also valued from the perspective of the threshold 
hypothesis, in which international reserves allow countries to deal better with financial 
globalization. Many researchers have attempted to develop a yardstick to measure the 
level of international reserves adequacy. While some have focused on whether foreign 
reserves are sufficient enough to cover non-FDI foreign liabilities or short-term liabilities 
(Greenspan 1999 for the “Guidotti-Greenspan criteria”; Prasad 2009), others have looked 
at the level of international reserves adequacy by examining whether reserves are 
sufficient enough to cover broad monetary aggregate such as M2 (de Beaufort Wijnholds 
and Kapteyn 2001, Obstfeld 2008, Obstfeld et al. 2009).8 Obstfeld et al. (2009) focus 
on the crisis scenario of an “external/internal double drain” where agents make a run on 
banks while trying to flee from domestic markets for hard currency. Interestingly, despite 
the anecdotal argument that Asia hold excessive international reserves, by this criterion, 
not all developing Asian countries have an excessively high level of reserves (Figure 
2.5).9
7 Mendoza et al. (2009) also find that countries with less developed financial markets may experience welfare losses 
by liberalizing capital markets unless the liberalization policy is accompanied by other factors such as technology 
transfer, financial markets development, and risk-sharing, all of which can take some time to materialize. This 
evidence is supported by Kim et al. (2008) and Fujiki and Terada-Hagiwara (2007), particularly on the issue of risk-
sharing benefits such as consumption smoothing, which has scarcely been achieved among developing countries.
8 de Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapteyn (200) argue that money stock in an economy is a proxy for potential capital 
flight by domestic residents, and therefore can be a measure of the intensity of the “internal drain.”
9 Bird and Rajan (200) show how the level of international reserve adequacy can appear different depending on 
what variable is used to scale the size of international reserves holding (i.e., short-term debt, GDP, M2, etc.).
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Figure 2.5: Foreign Reserves Adequacy Measured by the Ratios to M2, as of 2008
0 20 10040 60
% of M2
80
India
Singapore
Philippines
Thailand
Malaysia
Mongolia
Taipei,China
People’s Rep. of China
Indonesia
Hong Kong, China
Rep. of Korea
Bangladesh
Pakistan
Source:  CEIC Data Company Ltd., downloaded  August 2009.
B.  A Disaggregated Look at Capital Flows in Developing Asia
A country’s vulnerability to external shocks can be also affected by the composition of 
external assets and liabilities as stated in the composition hypothesis. Reviewing the ebbs 
and capital flows for developing Asia allows us to make interesting observations about the 
differences between the Asian crisis and the current crisis. 
Since the late 1980s—when many developing countries including those in Asia started 
liberalizing financial markets—highly integrated developing Asia experienced two waves 
of private capital inflows (Figure 3.1). The first wave began in the late 1980s and 
steadily increased its level through the mid-1990s, until it got abruptly interrupted by the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. The second wave began in 2002 and continuously 
increased its size by a larger degree than the first wave until 2007. However, it was again 
interrupted by the global financial crisis that started in mid-2008. By the end of 2008, the 
volume of cross-border capital flows to developing Asia had plummeted. 
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Figure 2.6: Capital Flows to/from Developing Asia 
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Note:  This figure includes only highly integrated developing Asian economies.
Sources: CEIC Data Company Ltd.; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics online. 
Portfolio and other investment inflows, including bank loans, contributed substantially to 
the decline of capital inflows in response to the current global financial crisis. The extent 
of decline in these types of capital inflows was profound especially in Hong Kong, China; 
India; Republic of Korea (Korea); and Taipei,China (Figure 3.2). Gross FDI, i.e., including 
both inflows and outflows, declined in many countries such as Malaysia; Philippines; 
Singapore; Taipei,China; and Thailand (Figure 3.3). However, total FDI inflows to 
highly integrated developing Asia even rose in 2008 mainly due to the relatively robust 
economy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The slowdown of FDI inflows started 
in the first quarter of 2009 in Korea; Philippines; Taipei,China; and Singapore where the 
export-oriented manufacturing (electronics) sectors were hit hard. In 2008, FDI outflows 
increased noticeably in the region, dominated by the outflows from the PRC. However, in 
many highly integrated Asian economies such as Hong Kong, China; Korea; Singapore; 
and Taipei,China where contagion effects from industrial countries are more pronounced, 
FDI outflows started to decline in the first quarter of 2009, reflecting the general shrinkage 
of capital flows across the world.10 
0 The same sort of observation can be made for cross-border mergers and acquisitions in the region.
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Figure 2.7: Portfolio and Other Investment Inflows
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 both downloaded September 2009.
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Figure 2.8: Foreign Direct Investment flows
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The above findings are consistent with the general consensus that FDI flows tend to 
be more stable than other forms of capital flows. The stable nature of FDI can be also 
observed by comparing the coefficient variation (standard deviations divided by the mean) 
of different types of capital flows. As Figure 3.4 shows, the coefficient of variation of FDI 
was by far lower than that of other types of capital flows, and stood out especially during 
the crisis periods. 
Figure 2.9: Volatility of Capital Flows in Selected Asian Economies
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Source:  Authors’ calculations.
A closer look at capital flows in developing Asia allows us to point out that the current   
crisis differs from the Asian financial crisis in several interesting ways. First, while            
the Asian crisis was more regionally contained, affecting a relatively small number of 
countries, the current financial crisis, which originated in the US, has impacted much 
more economies on a global scale, though to varying degrees. Hence, the environment 
for cross-border financing, including FDI and cross-border mergers and acquisitions deals, 
also declined universally. Corporate financial conditions got exacerbated by poor earnings 
due to drastically weakened demand in the real economy. This is in sharp contrast to the 
Asian crisis where foreign investors took advantage of greatly depreciated assets in some 
crisis-hit Asian countries (the "fire-sale" phenomenon), which contributed to continuous 
inflows of FDI to the region even during the crisis.11 For example, in Korea and Thailand, 
 Indonesia and Malaysia are exceptions. In Malaysia, FDI inflows were relatively flat during the crisis while 
Indonesia experienced a sharp decline in FDI inflows. Malaysia’s case can be explained by the capital controls 
policy implemented in the midst of the crisis. In the case of Indonesia, political and social instability along with its 
corruption-prone environment contributed to the country’s poor investment climate in the postcrisis period. 
What Makes Developing Asia Resilient in a Financially Globalized World?  | 13
FDI inflows increased, respectively, from US$1.2 billion and US$2.0 billion in 1990–1996, 
to US$5.9 billion and US$5.8 billion in 1997–1999.
Second, in terms of capital outflows, during the Asian financial crisis, the slowdown 
of capital flows was quite naturally concentrated in the crisis-hit countries, including 
Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand. By contrast, in the current crisis, some Asian 
countries, especially those that have started showing some signs of recovery, are making 
the best use of this kind of environment. They are aggressively acquiring depreciated 
assets across the world. Hence, there has been evidence of an increase in outward FDI 
in many developing Asia, including the PRC.
Third, even though the collapse of capital inflows this time is more significant in size than 
that during the Asian crisis, strong economic fundamentals in the region, including sound 
financial institutions, have helped these economies to successfully redress and manage 
the adverse shocks of the global crisis. The soundness and robustness of financial 
institutions in the region can be ensured by various indicators such as nonperforming loan 
ratios, risk-weighted capital adequacy ratios, and loan–deposit ratios. Most of the Asian 
economies have sustained exchange rate stability as well.12 That along with massive 
foreign reserves has helped to sustain investors’ confidence in the region.  
Finally, in the current crisis, prompt policy responses to financial distress and credit 
crunch—enabled by sound financial institutions and economic fundamentals—have kept 
the adverse impacts of the crisis minimal in the Asian region. In response to the global 
credit crunch, central banks in many countries provided swift liquidity support, provided 
financial institutions with guarantees to their liabilities, and injected capital into troubled 
banks. Current account surpluses, high sovereign ratings, and expanded coverages 
of deposit insurance have all helped many countries to buffer the financial distress by 
supporting repatriation of capital (BIS 2009). The bilateral swap arrangements with the 
Federal Reserve as well as cooperative initiatives among Asian countries, including the 
Chiang Mai Initiative, ensured accessibility to foreign exchange reserves.13 
These findings suggest that economies can be resilient to external shocks in a financially 
globalized world only when they meet a certain set of preconditions, which include sound 
macroeconomic conditions, financial development, and institutional development. In such 
an environmental, policy makers can respond appropriately and swiftly to external shocks 
and minimize their potential repercussions. Before we further investigate the benefits 
of financial globalization with reference to what kind of preconditions are needed, we 
analyze the determinants of different types of capital flows and draw policy implications 
on how a country can attract capital flows.
2 For example, the rate of depreciation of the Korean won and Thai baht was 85% and 09% during 996–997, but 
was only % and 9%, respectively, in 2008 (January-October).
 The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation, which is expected to operate by end-2009, will allow ASEAN countries 
plus PRC, Japan, and Korea to draw 50% (large countries) to 500% (small countries) of their contributions to a 
US$20 billion multilateral reserves pooling arrangement.  
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III. “External” versus “Internal” Factors Affecting Capital Flows
The previous section showed that different types of capital flows can respond to financial 
crises differently. The next question we want to explore is, To what extent can the volume 
and direction of capital flows be determined by global conditions or domestic policies? If 
external factors dominate internal ones, that means policy makers can hardly influence 
the flows of foreign capital. However, if internal conditions—the country-specific factors—
are found to drive capital flows, policy makers can and should focus on putting sound 
macroeconomic policies in place to affect foreign capital. The recent collapse of capital 
inflows to developing Asia motivates us to examine the relative importance of external 
and internal factors, especially focusing on the nature of capital flows in the region.
To explore the determinants of capital flows, we first implement the gravity model for 
bilateral FDI flow data and examine what factors, domestic or external, drive FDI inflows. 
Like the original gravity model, our estimation model incorporates variables pertaining 
to both the source country (i.e., the country where the capital flow originates) and the 
host country (that which receives the capital) such as real income, distance between 
the two, and their dependencies on imports. We also include variables particularly on 
the conditions of the host country such as ratio of intra-industry trade, share of mineral 
and fuel exports, labor costs, level of human capital development, level of infrastructure 
development, tariff barriers, whether or not the host country participates in free trade 
agreements, and so forth. In the analysis, external factors are proxied by real income per 
capita of home countries, including that of the G3 countries.
For FDI, the data on bilateral FDI flows from the UNCTAD/TNC database are used for 
the period 1994–2007. In the analysis, eight highly integrated Asian economies, namely 
PRC; Hong Kong, China; India; Korea; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; and Thailand, 
are the host countries while there are 61 source countries, including both industrial 
and developing countries.14 The gravity equation model with an unbalanced panel 
econometric procedure is applied for five nonoverlapping 3-year periods. To deal with the 
issue of censored data, the Tobit model (truncated regression model) is applied. More 
details on the estimation model and the estimation results can be found in Appendix 2.
The estimation results (shown in Table A2.1) indicate that internal factors are important in 
attracting FDI inflows.15 The significant internal factors include per capita income, labor 
costs, development of human capital, trade and financial openness, as well as the level 
of infrastructure development. The performance of G3 countries’ per capita income is also 
important in determining FDI flows to the region. During the estimation period, a 1.0% 
drop in the per capita real income of the G3 countries could cause a decline in FDI flows 
to the region by 1.5% (Figure 3.1).16 
 The eight highly integrated Asian economies can be both “host” and “source” countries.
5 This finding is consistent with Mandilaras and Popper (2009).
6 The impact of real income per capita of the G countries is derived from the coefficients corresponding to the per 
capita real income variable of home country (Mi) and its interaction term with the G dummy (Mi*dummyG), i.e., 
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Figure 3.1: Responsiveness of Capital Flows to G3 Growth
9
6
3
0
Pe
rc
en
t
FDI
1.5
5.4
5.7
8.6
5.2
Portfolio
inows
Bank loans
(inows)
Portfolio
outows
Bank loans
(outows)
Notes: The figure shows the estimated coefficients of the per capita real income variable in the estimation models for different 
types of capital flows. The dependent variables are normalized by the GDP of the corresponding host country.
 For the details on the estimation models, see Appendixes 2 and .
Source:  Authors’ estimations.
We apply a similar approach to examine the determinants of other types of capital flows, 
specifically portfolio investment and bank loans. However, since the bilateral flow data are 
limited for these types of capital flows, we do not employ the gravity model.17 We instead 
use balance of payments data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) and 
apply the Tobit model to examine the determinants of portfolio and bank lending flows 
to 10 highly integrated developing Asian economies during 1990–2008.18 Appendix 3 
provides more details of the regression models and results. 
In contrast to FDI, the estimation results show that the G3 countries’ GDP significantly 
affects the movements of bank loans and portfolio inflows, i.e., a 1.0% increase in G3’s 
GDP leads to a 5.7% rise in bank loans inflows and a 5.4% increase in portfolio inflows 
(Figure 3.1). The effect is found to be stable before and after the Asian crisis. The real 
per capita income of key trading partners in the region is also found to significantly 
affect both portfolio and bank loan flows to the region. However, the magnitude of the 
coefficients of this variable is much smaller than that of the G3 per capita GDP and this 
variable is found to be significant only for the portfolio regressions. This finding reflects 
the tendency that investors outside the Asian region, especially those from the G3 
countries, are crucial players in affecting capital inflows of portfolio investment or bank 
lending in the region.
.5 = 0.8 + 0.66 (see Column C of Table A2.).
7 See full discussions of the determinants for these types of capital flows in Jongwanich (2009 and 200). Note that 
the bilateral data of portfolio and bank loans are limited; the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey from the IMF 
reports bilateral flows in equity and debt securities only for 997 and 200–2007. 
8 PRC; Hong Kong, China; Korea; Indonesia; India; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; and Thailand.
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The per capita income of the G3 countries is also found to affect portfolio and bank loans 
outflows. A 1.0% increase in G3 countries’ per capita GDP could increase portfolio and 
bank loans outflows by 8.6% and 4.5%, respectively. The output performance of the home 
country and its financial liberalization policy are also found to contribute to portfolio and 
bank lending outflows.
All in all, the G3 economies are crucial in determining the movements of short-term 
capital flows while their impacts on long-term capital are relatively limited. It is, therefore, 
not surprising that bank loans and portfolio investment deteriorated more significantly 
than FDI in response to the current financial crisis. Based on the estimation results, 
the importance of internal factors is also recognized, especially for longer-term capital, 
suggesting that the country-specific factors, e.g., business and policy environment, 
including financial and trade openness, are still crucial to attract such capital flows.  
IV. How Does Financial Globalization Affect Macroeconomic 
Performance?
We have observed that both domestic and external factors can drive capital flows in 
the Asian region. In a financially globalized world, as we have repeatedly mentioned, 
institutions or policies cannot be determined independently from other macroeconomic 
policy objectives because of the constraint based on the trilemma hypothesis. In other 
words, policy makers must face a trade-off issue of choosing two out of the three policies: 
monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and financial openness. However, each 
combination of two policies, or each one of the three policies, has its own merits and 
demerits in terms of implications on macroeconomic performance. Here, we empirically 
examine the impact of the trilemma policy choices on output volatility. 
Our intention is to examine whether certain policy combinations can create a favorable 
or unfavorable macroeconomic environment in this globalized world while focusing on the 
performance of highly integrated Asian economies. While there has been an anecdotal 
argument (at least before the current crisis) that the world economy has experienced a 
drop in output volatility in recent years, it is true that highly integrated Asian economies 
collectively have outperformed other developing economies persistently in terms of 
output growth stability. Figure 4.1 shows that output volatility—measured by the standard 
deviations of per capita output growth rates—for highly integrated Asian economies has 
been maintained at lower levels than in other developing countries or less integrated 
Asian countries. The level of stability is even comparable to that of the industrialized 
countries. Considering that macroeconomic volatility can have a negative impact on long-
term economic growth as Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005) found, we may find evidence 
that Asian countries’ international macroeconomic management have allowed them to be 
better suited to cope with globalization. 
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Figure 4.1: Output Volatility by Region
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A.  The Estimation Model
Following Aizenman et al. (2008), our estimation looks into the effect of three policies 
based on the trilemma for the period of 1972–2006. Our focus will be placed on the 
effect of financial liberalization, but because the degree of financial globalization must 
be determined in conjunction with two other macroeconomic objectives, we will look into 
the effect of financial liberalization while controlling for one other policy goal, i.e., either 
monetary independence or exchange rate stability. From the perspective of the two 
hypotheses we previously introduced, our estimation model is a hybrid that incorporates 
both the threshold and composition hypotheses. Consistent with the threshold hypothesis, 
we assume that the preconditions of the level of international reserves holding may 
matter for how financial liberalization, along with two other trilemma policies, can affect 
output volatility. Therefore, we include the level of foreign exchange reserves and interact 
it with the trilemma variables. Following the composition hypothesis, our estimation model 
also includes different types of capital flows, i.e., FDI, portfolio investment, and other  
(bank lending) flows. 
More specifically, the benchmark estimation model is given by:
y TLM IR TLM TR X Z Dit it it it it it t i it= + + + ×( ) + + + +α α α α e0 1 2 3 B Γ Φ  (1)
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yit is the measure for macro policy performance for country i in year t, i.e., output 
volatility, measured as 5-year standard deviations of the growth rate of per capita output. 
TLMit is a vector of any two of the three trilemma indexes, which measures the extent of 
achievement in the three policy goals of monetary independence, exchange rate stability, 
and financial openness.19 TRit is the level of international reserves (excluding gold) as a 
ratio to GDP, and (TLMit x TRit) is an interaction term between the trilemma indexes and 
the threshold variables that allow one to observe whether they complement or substitute 
for other policy stances.
Xit is a vector of macroeconomic control variables that includes the variables most used 
in the literature. It includes relative income (to the US—based on the Penn World Tables 
per capita real income), its quadratic term, trade openness, terms-of-trade shock (defined 
as the 5-year standard deviation of trade openness times terms-of-trade growth), fiscal 
procyclicality (defined as the correlations between Hondrick-Prescott [HP]–detrended 
government spending series and HP-detrended real GDP series), M2 growth, private 
credit creation, inflation rate, and inflation volatility. Zt is a vector of global shocks that 
includes changes in US real interest rate, world output gap, and relative oil price shocks 
(measured as the log of the ratio of the oil price index to the world’s consumer price 
index). Di is a set of characteristic dummies that includes a dummy for oil-exporting 
countries and regional dummies. eit is an independently identically distributed error term. 
The estimation model is also extended by including a vector, ExtFinit, of external finances, 
which includes net FDI inflows, net portfolio inflows, net “other” inflows (mostly bank 
lending), short-term debt, and total debt service. For net capital flows, we use IFS data 
and define them as external liabilities (capital inflows with a positive sign) minus assets 
(capital inflows with a negative sign) for each type of flow. Negative values mean that a 
country experiences a net outflow of capital. Short-term debt is included as the ratio of 
total external debt and total debt service as a share of gross national income (GNI). Both 
variables are retrieved from the World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset. 
The dataset is organized into 5-year panels of 1972–1976, 1977–1981, 1982–1986, 
1987–1991, 1992–1996, 1997–2001, and 2002–2006. All time-varying variables are 
included as 5-year averages.20 The regression is conducted for the group of developing 
countries and a subgroup of highly integrated developing economies.21 Robust estimation 
is conducted to downweight outliers that can arise in both the dependent variable and 
explanatory variables.22
9 Aizenman et al. (2008) have shown that these three measures of the trilemma are linearly related. Therefore, it 
is most appropriate to include two of the indexes simultaneously, rather than individually, or all three jointly. 
That means that for each sample, three types of regressions, i.e., those with three different combinations of two 
trilemma variables, are estimated.
20 The variable for relative income and its quadratic terms are sampled from the initial year of each five-year panel.
2 The highly integrated economies are defined as the countries classified as either emerging or frontier during 
980–997 by the International Financial Corporation. For those in Asia, emerging market economies are 
“Emerging East Asia-” defined by Asian Development Bank plus India.
22 Explanatory variables that persistently appear to be statistically insignificant are dropped from the estimation.
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B. Basic Regressions Results: Output Volatility  
with Foreign Reserves as a Threshold
The estimation results in Table 5.1 (columns B, C, E, and F) show that output volatility 
is negatively associated with financial openness in developing countries though it is not 
found to be significant among highly integrated countries. The result is independent of 
whether it is paired with monetary independence or exchange rate stability. Interestingly, 
exchange rate stability is found to destabilize output movement in both samples.23 At the 
same time, the interaction term between this variable and the one for foreign exchange 
reserves is found to have a statistically negative effect, suggesting that countries can 
cancel or reverse the destabilizing effect of pursuing greater exchange rate stability if they 
hold higher levels of foreign reserves than a threshold. Based on the estimation result, 
the threshold to reverse the destabilizing effect of exchange rate stability is about 20% of 
GDP. 
Table 4.1: Determinants of Output Volatility in Highly Integrated  
and Developing Economies
Highly Integrated Economies Developing Economies
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Private credit creation 0.000 −0.005 0.00 −0.00 −0.008 −0.005
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007]
Monetary independence (MI) −0.08 −0.08 −0.09 −0.05
[0.07] [0.08]** [0.0] [0.0]**
MI x reserves 0.008 0.096 0.005 0.2
[0.088] [0.09] [0.085] [0.089]
Exchange rate stability (ERS) 0.02 0.028 0.008 0.02
[0.009]** [0.009]*** [0.007] [0.006]*
ERS x reserves −0.25 −0.50 −0.086 −0.095
[0.052]** [0.05]*** [0.0]* [0.0]**
KA Openness −0.00 −0.002 −0.020 −0.0
[0.009] [0.009] [0.008]** [0.008]*
KAOPEN x reserves 0.062 0.06 0.086 0.08
[0.07] [0.02] [0.05]* [0.02]
Net FDI inflows/GDP −0.2 −0.05 −0.55 0.07 0.092 0.09
[0.07] [0.2] [0.] [0.068] [0.07] [0.070]
Net portfolio inflows/GDP −0. −0.08 −0.08 0.2 0.289 0.286
[0.0] [0.5] [0.7] [0.22]** [0.29]** [0.27]**
Net ‘other’ inflows/GDP 0.025 0.07 0.022 0.069 0.06 0.07
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.029]** [0.029]** [0.029]**
Short-term debt −0.0 −0.008 −0.0 −0.009 −0.008 −0.007
  (as % of total external debt) [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06]
Total debt service 0.008 0.07 0.0 0.06 0.08 0.078
  (as % of GNI) [0.0] [0.0] [0.0] [0.05]* [0.05]** [0.05]**
Observations 5 5 5   
Adjusted R-squared 0.5 0.29 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.0
* significant at 0%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at %. 
Note:  Robust regressions are implemented. Standard errors are in brackets. The dummy for Sub-Saharan countries is included in 
the regressions.  Other control variables are not reported to conserve space.
Source:  Authors’ estimation.
2 This result is consistent with Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2005) and Haruka (2007), both of which find conversely that 
more flexible exchange rate regimes are associated with smaller output volatility. 
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This finding has a significant relevance to Asian economies. Figure 4.2 shows ERS 
and foreign reserves as a percentage of GDP (IR) in Asia and other countries. In the 
period 1990-2008, the average level of exchange rate stability for highly integrated 
and developing Asia is higher than that for highly integrated Latin America and 
European countries, but lower than the group average for developing countries and 
other subgroups. At the same time, the ratio of international reserves holding for highly 
integrated Asian economies is much higher than in all other regions except the Middle 
East, and much greater than the threshold level of about 20%. These panels of figures 
reflect that developing Asian economies have pursued international macroeconomic 
policies that allow their massive IR holding to reduce the level of output volatility.24 
Figure 4.2: Regional Comparison of Exchange Rate Stability and Foreign Reserves
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2 Based on the estimation result, for example, Singapore—a country with a middle level of exchange rate stability 
(0.5 in 2002–2006) and a very high level of international reserve holding (00% of GDP)—is able to reduce output 
volatility by 2.7–2.9 percentage points while the PRC, whose exchange rate stability index is as high as 0.97 and 
whose ratio of reserves holding is 0% of GDP, is able to reduce volatility by .–.7 percentage points. 
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Among the disaggregated capital flow variables, bank lending (i.e., “other” capital flows in 
the IFS dataset) and net portfolio investment tend to have a statistically positive impact 
on output volatility. In other words, the more bank loans or net portfolio inflows a country 
receives, the more likely it is to experience higher output volatility, reflecting the “hot 
money” argument regarding cross-border, short-term capital flows such as bank lending 
and portfolio investment. FDI flows do not appear to have any definitive impact on output 
volatility. At the very least, this type of capital flows do not necessarily destabilize the 
economy. 
C. Extended Analyses: Output Volatility, Financial Development,  
 and Cross-border Capital Flows 
While foreign reserves seem to play a role in how international macroeconomic 
management affects output volatility, financial development, included in the estimation 
as private credit creation (as a percentage of GDP: PCGDP), turns out to be statistically 
insignificant. The statistical insignificance of financial development could illustrate 
that financial development per se can be a double-edged sword. That is, although 
further financial development may enhance output growth and stability by ameliorating 
information asymmetry, enabling more efficient capital allocation, and allowing for further 
risk sharing, it can also expose economies to high-risk, high-return financial instruments, 
thereby involving the possibility of amplifying real shocks and/or falling into the boom-bust 
cycles. 
Although we do not find any impact of financial development as a level, we still suspect 
that financial development can interact with other international macroeconomic policies 
and affect output volatility indirectly. This attempt is based on our anecdotal observation 
that policy makers seem to incorporate the level of financial development as one of the 
important factors in their decision making. For example, the PRC has been alleged to 
pursue closed financial markets with exchange rate stability as precautionary measures 
to protect its underdeveloped financial system. In addition, some argue that a country 
with newly liberalized but underdeveloped financial systems tend to experience financial 
fragility (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998). The economic damage can be greater 
especially when the financial fragility is coupled with a currency crisis (Hutchison and Noy 
2005).
1.  Trilemma Variables with Financial Development as a Threshold
Given the potentially ambivalent effects of financial development, we suspect the 
nonlinearity of financial development.25 Hence, we introduce the dummy variables for 
different level groups of financial development. That is, X-HI is assigned a value of 1 for a 
25 When PCGDP is interacted with the trilemma variables, the interaction term was never found to be insignificant. 
This suggests that we cannot assume the effect of PCGDP on the link between the trilemma indexes and output 
volatility to be monotonic. Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005) and Kose et al. (2009) find the nonlinear effect of 
financial development especially in interaction with financial liberalization.
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country that has a measure of financial development (X) above the 75th percentile in the 
distribution of 5-year averages of X within a 5-year window, and zero, otherwise. X-LO 
takes a value of 1 if a country has a level of financial development below 25th percentile, 
and zero, otherwise. X-MD takes a value of one if a country’s financial development level 
lies between 25th and 75th percentiles in a 5-year period. Financial development (X) is 
proxied by three variables, namely, private credit creation (FD), stock market capitalization 
(SMKC), and bond market capitalization (all as a percentage of GDP). 
Table 4.2 reports the estimation results when private credit creation (FD) is used as the 
measure of financial development, and presents some interesting findings among highly 
integrated economies. The estimated coefficient on the term “ERS x Medium FD” is 
significant in columns 4 and 6. In column 6, the coefficient on “ERS x High FD” is also 
significant, and both “ERS x Medium FD” and “ERS x High FD” are statistically greater 
than “ERS x Low FD” in the estimates’ magnitude.26 With these results, we can surmise 
that for countries with underdeveloped financial markets, higher levels of exchange rate 
stability do not lead to higher output volatility. Those with medium levels of financial 
development do seem to experience higher output volatility when they pursue a more 
stable exchange rate, suggesting that countries with newly developed financial markets 
can be volatile when they pursue greater exchange rate stability.27
Deepening credit market and financial openness seem to have interesting interactive 
effects on output volatility, especially again among highly integrated economies. While 
those highly integrated economies with medium or high levels of financial development 
tend to experience less output volatility when they decide to pursue greater financial 
openness, those with shallow credit markets are expected to experience greater output 
volatility. When the coefficient on “KAOPEN x Medium FD” and “KAOPEN x High FD” 
is compared to that of “KAOPEN x Low FD”, the difference is found to be statistically 
significant. These results indicate that highly integrated economies need to be equipped 
with deeper credit markets if they want to reap the benefit of financial liberalization on 
their output volatility. Having a higher level of financial openness and deep credit market 
can yield a synergistic impact to dampen output volatility, presumably by facilitating 
allocation of capital and ameliorating information asymmetry, thereby reducing the cost 
of capital. The worst and more significant case is that a country with shallow credit 
markets can exacerbate output volatility caused by financial liberalization. For developing 
countries, financial openness may be the volatility reducer when coupled with a high level 
of financial development—however, the relationship is weak.  
26 The results are shown in the bottom part of Table 5.2 that reports the Wald test statistics for the tests on the 
differences in the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms between the trilemma indexes and different FD 
groups.
27 In both columns  and 6, the estimated coefficients on the interaction term between ERS and IR are found to be 
significantly negative. Using the estimates, we can estimate that to cancel or lessen the volatility-enhancing effect 
of ERS, highly integrated economies with medium (or higher) levels of financial development need to hold at 
least 2–26% of GDP of international reserves. However, this rule is not applicable to those with underdeveloped 
financial markets.
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Table 4.2: Impacts of Financial Market Development on Output Volatility
Developing Economies Highly Integrated Economies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private credit creation  
(percent of GDP) 
−0.008 −0.005 −0.008 0.00 0.000 0.000
[0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.006]
MI x −0.028 −0.006 −0.050 −0.02
   International reserves [0.067] [0.06] [0.067] [0.06]
MI x −0.08 −0.0 −0.0 −0.06
   High FD [0.07] [0.06] [0.09] [0.07]
MI x −0.05 −0.09 −0.008 −0.07
    Medium FD [0.02] [0.02] [0.0] [0.0]
MI x −0.005 −0.09 0.00 −0.0
   Low FD [0.05] [0.0] [0.02] [0.08]*
ERS x −0.08 −0.05 −0.08 −0.058
   International reserves [0.0] [0.0] [0.07]** [0.00]*
ERS x 0.008 0.05 0.07 0.05
   High FD [0.00] [0.009] [0.02] [0.009]*
ERS x 0.005 0.005 0.08 0.0
    Medium FD [0.006] [0.005] [0.007]** [0.007]**
ERS x −0.007 −0.002 0.0 −0.02
   Low FD [0.007] [0.006] [0.06] [0.00]
KAOPEN x 0.009 −0.005 0.02 0.025
   International reserves [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.026]
KAOPEN x −0.06 −0.05 −0.08 −0.0
   High FD [0.00] [0.0] [0.00]* [0.00]
KAOPEN x −0.00 −0.00 −0.008 −0.006
    Medium FD [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
KAOPEN x −0.008 −0.00 0.00 0.05
   Low FD [0.00] [0.009] [0.07]** [0.05]***
Adjusted R-squared 0.2 0.22 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.0
MI: High vs. Med. 0.07 0.2 0.0 0.0
MI: Med. vs. Low 0.82 0.00 0.5 .8
MI: High vs. Low 0.69 0.22 0.55 .25
ERS: High vs. Med. 0. .56 0.0 0.02
ERS: Med. vs. Low .27* 0.02 0.2 7.8**
ERS: High vs. Low 0.02 .78** 0.5 5.5**
KAOPEN: High vs. Med. 0.02 .80 .25 0.70
KAOPEN: Med. vs. Low 0.2 0.05 7.8** 0.70***
KAOPEN: High vs. Low 0.0 0.85 0.25*** .82***
FD = financial market development, MI = monetary independence, ERS = exchange rate stability.
Note: Significance of the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms between the trilemma indexes and different FD groups is 
tested using a Wald test.
The estimations with stock and bond market development also yield an interesting result 
(not reported). In sum, again, financial liberalization can be beneficial when it is coupled 
with highly developed stock markets (measured by stock market capitalization). This is an 
indication that financial liberalization needs to be hand-in-hand with financial development 
in both banking and equity sectors. This means that financial development does not 
merely mean conventional financial intermediation through the banking system, but also 
includes more efficient resource allocation and portfolio diversification through stock 
markets.28 
28 The estimations with bond markets (both private and public) does not yield any insightful results, but mainly due 
to data limitations. 
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Where do Asian economies stand in terms of financial development? Figure 4.3 compares 
the level of financial development, measured by the different aspects of financial markets, 
across different groups of economies. One can see that in terms of development in the 
banking sector or stock markets, the financial development of highly integrated economies 
in Asia is quite comparable to that of industrialized countries. However, less integrated 
Asian countries are still behind other countries.
Figure 4.3: Measuring Financial Development
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Financial development in terms of bond market development presents a different story. 
In this type of financial development, whether public or private bond sectors, even 
highly integrated Asian economies still lag behind the industrial countries. Clearly, in 
Asia, there is still room for both public and private bond markets to catch up with those 
of industrial countries. Ironically, Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) argue 
that a stable macroeconomic environment may have been one of the reasons for the 
underdevelopment of bond markets in Asia. The debate for developing bond markets 
in Asia has been active, especially since the Asian crisis. The main motivations for 
advocating bond market development in the region can be twofold. First, more developed 
bond markets in the Asian region should promote more regional risk sharing, which 
has been advocated especially among policy makers as a lesson from the Asian crisis. 
Second, bond market development should contribute to alleviating the global imbalances 
by allowing Asian capital to be “recycled” within the Asian region. However, for now, the 
impact of bond market development and implications for Asia need to be discussed in 
future research.
2. Interactions between Financial Development and Different Types  
 of Cross-border Capital Flows 
Having seen the impact of financial globalization and other macroeconomic policy 
choices from the perspective of the threshold hypothesis, let us focus on the composition 
hypothesis. Previously, we have seen that net inflows of portfolio investment and bank 
lending can raise output volatility. Given that de jure financial openness is found to 
interact with different levels of financial development differently, let us examine the 
interactions between financial development and external financing by extending the 
previous approach.
Columns (1) through (3) in Table 4.3 show the estimated coefficients for the interaction 
terms between different types of net capital inflows and the dummies for different levels 
of financial development measured by private credit creation (as a percentage of GDP: 
FD). The models shown in columns (1) through (3) contain different pairs of the trilemma 
variables (shown at the bottom row of the table). Columns (4) through (6) present the 
same type of exercise, but the level of financial development is measured by stock 
market capitalization (as a percentage of GDP: SMKC) instead of FD.29 
When FD is used as the measure of financial development, it appears that the 
coefficients for the interactions between net FDI inflows or net “other” inflows and the 
low level of financial development is significantly different from the other estimates. This 
implies that net inflows of FDI and bank lending can increase volatility only when the 
economy’s financial markets are underdeveloped. Thus, to prevent net FDI inflows or net 
bank lending inflows from increasing output volatility, an economy needs to be equipped 
with financial markets with medium or higher levels of development. 
29 The estimation models do include the benchmark macroeconomic variables and other characteristic dummies, 
though their estimation results are not reported in the table.
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Columns (4) through (6) present a different picture. When the level of financial 
development is measured by stock market capitalization, generally, the effect of FDI is 
found to be negative. The degree of negativity is higher especially when stock markets 
of the economy are underdeveloped. The result reported here needs to be interpreted 
with caution since, by using SMKC instead of FD, the number of observations shrinks by 
40%. However, with this reduced sample, if one wants to explain the negative coefficients 
with greater magnitude for the interactions between net FDI inflows and the low financial 
development dummy, which may be explained by the role of FDI as a tool to supplement 
an equity-type of domestic saving, thereby reducing output volatility. In fact, for the 
interactions with high-level stock market development, the magnitude of the coefficient 
becomes smaller. 
Table 4.3: Output Volatility: External Finances Interacted with Different Levels  
of Private Credit Creation or Stock Market Capitalization
Financial Development 
Level Dummies
Private Credit Creation Stock Market Capitalization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net FDI 
Inflow
0.055 0.06 0.055 −0.077 −0.5 −0.86
High (0.096) (0.02) (0.0) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07)*
0.00 0.068 0.057 −0.5 −0.59 −0.7
Medium (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.096) (0.099) (0.02)*
0.502 0.506 0.52 −0.209 −0.28 −0.29
Low (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.097)** (0.0)** (0.0)**
Net 
Portfolio 
Inflow
0.096 0.00 0.069 −0.079 −0.095 −0.2
High (0.098) (0.0) (0.0) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067)*
0.07 0.000 0.022 −0.086 −0.067 −0.069
Medium (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.) (0.) (0.6)
0.090 0.6 0.5 0.29 0. 0.
Low (.0) (.07) (.07) (0.087) (0.088) (0.089)
Net 
“Other” 
Inflow
0.02 0.02 0.07 −0.55 −0.6 −0.08
High (0.062) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)*** (0.052)*** (0.05)***
0.002 0.009 0.008 −0.062 −0.065 −0.06
Medium (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
0.8 0.79 0.9 0.022 0.02 0.00
Low (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.0)*** (0.068) (0.069) (0.07)
Included trilemma variables MI MI ERS MI MI ERS
ERS KAOPEN KAOPEN ERS KAOPEN KAOPEN
* significant at 0%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at %. 
Note:  Robust regressions are implemented. Standard errors are in brackets. Columns () through () show the estimated 
coefficients for the interaction terms between different types of net capital inflows and the dummies for different levels 
of financial development measured by private credit creation (as a percentage of GDP: FD). For columns () through 
(), different pairs of the trilemma variables are included (see the bottom row). For Columns () through (6), the level of 
financial development is measured by stock market capitalization (as a percentage of GDP: SMKC). The estimation models 
do include the benchmark macroeconomic variables and other characteristic dummies though their estimation results are 
omitted. 
Source:  Authors’ estimation.
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Net bank lending inflows can help reduce output volatility for economies with highly 
developed stock markets. This can be explained by the complementarity between 
overseas bank loans and domestic stock market. In fact, when the variable for net bank 
lending inflows is interacted with SMKC instead of the dummies for the different levels of 
stock market development, the estimated coefficient for the interaction term is found to 
be negative. That means that the effect of stock market development on net bank lending 
inflows is monotonically negative, which supports the complementarity between net bank 
lending and SMKC. This kind of complementarity is also weakly observed between net 
portfolio inflows and SMKC.
V. Managing Foreign Reserves
In the previous section, we investigated the role of international reserves holding as well 
as the impact of financing from both the domestic market and foreign investors. Among 
these factors, as we have repetitively pointed out, the massive and rapidly increasing 
accumulation of foreign reserves is the quintessential Asian phenomenon in contemporary 
international finance. In other words, progress in financial globalization has manifested in 
the asset side of developing Asia in the past several years, a large portion of which has 
been composed of US dollar assets. We revisit how foreign reserves have so far been 
managed, and review their underlying issues.
Obstfeld et al. (2009) argue that reserves accumulation is a key tool for dealing with 
domestic financial instability as well as exchange rate variability under a “managed 
floating plus policy regime.”  In other words, a primary reason for a central bank to hold 
reserves is to protect the domestic banking sector and domestic credit markets more 
broadly, while limiting external currency depreciation. 
Obstfeld et al. continue to argue that the need for such protection is much higher in 
countries with fragile financial systems and currency mismatch. As most developing 
countries are constrained to hold external liabilities that are denominated in foreign 
currencies, the problem of currency mismatch of external assets and liabilities is more 
serious in these countries than in industrialized countries. As local currency bond markets 
are still underdeveloped in the region, developing Asia is no exception. 
While the high level of reserves revealed is crucial to cushion against external shocks 
over the past year, which was also highlighted in the empirical analysis in the previous 
section, carrying excessive reserves entails costs due to its poor management (Bird and 
Rajan 2003). In fact, most of developing Asia already meets the criterion suggested by 
conventional measures in terms of precautionary needs, such as the Guidotti-Greenspan 
rule (Feldstein 1999), which says that a country’s liquid foreign exchange reserves should 
at all times cover its foreign currency debt repayable within 1 year (shown in the right-
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hand side of Figure 5.1), and that reserves can cover import bills for a number of months 
(shown in the left-hand side of Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1: Reserves Adequacy Measures
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Efforts have been made to reduce the need to hold excessive amounts of foreign 
reserves in the region. In particular, extensive reforms of the banking sector, with strict 
enforcement of regulation and supervision, have proven to be crucial in shielding against 
the volatile flows seen over the year. Meanwhile, development of a local currency-
denominated bond market has been put forward mainly to mitigate the risk of currency 
mismatch. 
A. Recent Reserves Management in Developing Asia
In developing Asia, a combination of strong current account accumulation coupled with 
capital inflows, though to a lesser extent, has resulted in a large expansion in foreign 
reserve holdings. Principles governing reserve management can be categorized into two 
types—one where liquidity is a priority and the other that can be invested in less liquid 
markets with a medium- to long-term investment horizon. The liquidity consideration is 
important for the portion that needs to cover immediate precautionary needs, i.e., short-
term debt repayment and, say, 3 months worth of import bills. 
In cases where liquidity consideration is important, investing in government bonds—
particularly US Treasuries—the US dollar and other highly liquid government bonds tend 
to be appropriate in securing its liquidity, and has been the practice. In fact, 64% of world 
reserves were held in US dollar assets in 2008, although at a declining trend. While the 
country breakdown of the currency denomination of foreign reserves is not available, 
a number of indicators, such as a share of US Treasury securities holding (percent of 
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total reserves), indicate that Asia’s foreign reserves are invested largely in US dollar-
denominated assets more than what can be warranted by precautionary needs. The 
fact that a large portion of the foreign reserves are invested in US dollar-denominated 
assets indicates that either liquidity consideration is overemphasized in the region and/or 
alternative financial instruments are missing.
In cases where liquidity is less of a consideration, any asset class consistent with 
diversified risk and/or return objective—bonds, equities, direct investments, hedge 
funds—are appropriate potentially with the goal of maximizing risk-adjusted returns. This 
portion might be managed within the balance sheet of the monetary authority such as 
the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, or through a separate entity, i.e., a sovereign wealth 
fund (SWF). Establishing an SWF has been a natural reaction to the increasing concern 
over foregone return-seeking opportunities by keeping the foreign reserves in the steady 
but low return yielding assets. Except for Singapore and Hong Kong, China, where SWFs 
have an established history, most of the SWFs in the region are newly created ones 
during the last decade—the period that coincides with the rapid accumulation of foreign 
reserves in these economies (Table 6.1). Assets of these SWFs are transferred from 
foreign reserves with an aim to seek more strategic longer-term investment with higher 
returns. However, the role of such SWFs has been limited due to its limited portfolio size 
so far. 
Table 5.1: Sovereign Wealth Fund of Selected Developing Asia
Economy Name of Fund Year of Inception
Singapore Government of Singapore Investment Corporation 98
PRC China Investment Corporation 2007
Singapore Temasek Holdings 97
Hong Kong, China Investment Portfolio (Hong Kong Monetary Authority 998
Brunei Darussalam Brunei Investment Agency 98
Korea, Republic of Korea Investment Corporation 2005
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional Bhd. 99
Kazakhstan National Oil Fund 2000
Taipei,China National Stabilization Fund 2000
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund 999
Timor Leste Petroleum Fund 2005
Uzbekistan Fund for Reconstruction and Development 2006
Source:  Park (2007).
Consequently, it is still the case that the bulk of reserves appear to be currently managed 
very conservatively, which is reflected in the overallocation to US dollar-denominated 
assets, thereby reducing reserves diversification. Given the current medium- to long-term 
concerns over the US’s fiscal position, this is beginning to be a concern for policy makers. 
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B. Better Reserves Management in the Future
Despite the deteriorating outlook for the US economy since the onset of the recent 
turmoil, demand for US Treasuries from developing Asia remains strong (Figure 5.2) 
mainly because  no other bond market is comparable in terms of size and liquidity. This 
conservative stance makes sense given the experience of the 1997/1998 Asian crisis, 
and the fact that the US dollar remains the centerpiece of any reserve management 
policy that requires liquidity as a principal determinant. However, given the worrisome 
US fiscal outlook, as well as the likely continuing central role of the dollar as the world’s 
reserve currency, the issue of reserve allocation becomes even more critical. In particular, 
if the cost of liquidity includes reduced reserve diversification and potential overexposure 
to a potentially depreciating US dollar, then the liquidity trade-off becomes less clear cut. 
Figure 5.2:  Change in US Treasury Holdings, August 2008 to June 2009 (percent)
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How could reserves be managed in the postglobal financial crisis era? The global 
financial crisis has created unparalleled opportunities for central banks to reshape reserve 
management. Amid growing concerns over the US economy and the US dollar, a number 
of debates are already under way, including a desire to increase the use of special 
drawing rights as a means to promote greater reserve diversification, among others.
If the overriding insistence on liquidity were to be less emphasized, particularly in cases 
where liquidity consideration is less important, then the Asian local currency government 
bond markets would have a potentially bigger role to play. Efforts are underway that will 
help further develop Asia’s bond markets, such as the Asian Bond Market Initiative under 
ASEAN+3 and the Asian Development Bank, as well the Asian Bond Fund initiative under 
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the Executive’s Meeting of East Asia and Pacific Central Banks group.30 In addition to the 
efforts to expand the size of the markets, harmonization of the region’s bond market rules 
and regulations has also been promoted to improve accessibility to the markets. 
Nonetheless, the still limited size of the local currency bond markets in the region is 
hindering intraregional trade in financial assets from becoming comparable to that with 
the rest of the world. The share of portfolio investments to neighboring countries, as 
mentioned in Section II, has more than doubled from 2000 to 2007, but still remains 
at 13% of total investments by 2007. A number of practical implementation difficulties 
remain, which include (i) difficulty of access for markets such as the PRC; and  
(ii) difficulty of reserve reallocation to increase Asian bond exposure given the already 
substantial exposure to the US dollar-denominated assets, i.e., US Treasuries. 
For better management of foreign reserves, further development of local currency bond 
markets both in size and accessibility are crucial. First, it would provide  additional 
financial instruments to diversify risks in the portfolio, which is currently overexposed to 
US dollar-denominated assets.31 Second, it would help to reduce the risk of currency 
mismatch by allowing countries to issue debts in its own currency, which in turn would 
reduce the need to accumulate the excess level of foreign reserves. Finally, strengthened 
regional bond markets would serve as a pool of funds and additional financial channels 
to finance investments in the region instead of being channeled through developed 
countries.
VI. Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications
The repatriation of capital flows and the dry-up of the US dollar market that intensified 
in late 2008 have brought the role and benefits of financial globalization to the fore. 
This paper reexamines the role of financial globalization in affecting highly integrated 
developing Asia’s economic stability, and the implications on the region’s efforts to 
successfully benefit from financial globalization. The paper first reviews key differences 
between the recent pullback in capital inflows versus that in 1997/1998 and the 
importance of “external’ and ‘internal” factors in determining capital flows. 
A number of notable distinctions between the current global crisis and the Asian financial 
crisis become evident. First, FDI shows a declining trend in response to the global 
crisis, in contrast to the Asian crisis. While the collapse of capital inflows driven by the 
global crisis has been more significant in size than those during the Asian crisis, strong 
economic fundamentals in the region, especially in financial institutions, helped these 
0 “Review of the Asian Bond Fund 2 Initiative.” EMEAP Working Group on Financial Markets, June 2006.
 Cheung (2009) proposes a way to diversify the foreign reserve portfolio by expanding balance sheets of central 
banks, and allocating the expanded portion to cross-holding regional currency bonds.
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economies to successfully redress and manage most of the adverse effects. Quick policy 
responses to the financial stress, credit shortage, and credit withdrawals managed to 
keep the adverse impacts minimal. 
A developing country with more open capital market tends to experience lower output 
volatility. Further, it is found that countries can mitigate the volatility-increasing effect of 
pursuing greater exchange rate stability if they hold a sufficiently high level of foreign 
reserves. Additionally, the more bank lending or more net portfolio inflows a country 
receives, the more likely it is to experience volatile output, reflecting the “hot money” 
argument regarding cross-border bank lending and portfolio investment. Meanwhile, FDI 
flows do not necessarily destabilize the economy, though stabilizing effects do not seem 
to be significant either.
The role of domestic financial sector development is investigated in detail. The regression 
analyses indicate that highly integrated economies need to be equipped with highly 
developed financial markets, particularly of banking and stock markets, if they want to 
reap the benefit of financial liberalization to reduce output volatility. The findings also 
suggest that a macroeconomic policy regime leaning more toward exchange rate stability 
is most likely to exacerbate output volatility when the economy is equipped with only 
medium levels of financial development. 
Additionally, the analysis reveals that net bank lending inflows can help reduce output 
volatility for economies with highly developed stock markets. This can be explained by 
the complementarities between overseas bank loans and domestic stock market. This 
complementarities argument can be also weakly observed between net portfolio inflows 
and stock market development.
In the sample examined in this paper, the levels of private credit creation (as a 
percentage of GDP) in highly integrated developing Asia are high and are categorized 
under the more developed financial market group. That means that for these economies, 
financial liberalization, by itself, can be volatility-reducing. Financial development, 
particularly in the banking sector in these economies, seems to have provided a favorable 
environment for reducing the level of output volatility. Having highly developed stock 
markets were also found useful in stabilizing the economy by complementing external 
financing. Meanwhile, there is significant room for a less integrated developing Asia to 
catch up with highly integrated developing Asia in financial development.
Having access to external financing by opening up the capital markets can be beneficial 
if advanced in a cautious manner, and if moved hand in hand with the development 
of domestic financial markets. However, bond market development, in particular, has 
been playing a limited role so far. For better management of foreign reserves, further 
development of local currency bond markets both in size and accessibility are crucial.  
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To summarize, the four key policy messages on financial globalization that can be drawn 
from this study are the following:
(i)   Shifting the composition of capital flows. Longer-term capital, such as FDI, 
is more desirable than short-term investment, given its stabilizing properties. 
Policies toward improving the investment climate would support such a shift and 
promote benefits from capital inflows in general and FDI in particular. Although 
“external” factors or the G3 economies’ growth prospects remain important 
for all types of capital flows, “pull” factors, especially supply-side capability, 
tend to be more important for FDI than for other capital flows. Thus, policies 
strengthening supply-side capacity and a country’s competitiveness are also 
important for supporting the composition shift. Improvement in infrastructure, in 
terms of both quantity and quality, is a priority for the government, especially in 
South Asian countries. Human capital needs to be further developed to improve 
labor productivity and offset a rise of labor costs in the region. Policies to 
reduce trade costs including custom reform, improve logistic services, increase 
legal certainty, and strengthen governance to enforce contracts and protect 
intellectual property rights need to be addressed. 
(ii)   Sequencing capital account opening. When countries open their capital 
account, they should not hasten to remove all associated restrictions, since 
such opening needs to progress hand in hand with domestic financial market 
development. Some Asian economies have relatively deep credit markets, 
enabling them to harness the benefits of financial liberalization. Efficient stock 
markets are particularly useful in stabilizing an economy by complementing 
external financing. A bond market, however, is yet to be developed. Highly 
integrated economies need to be equipped with highly developed financial 
markets if they want to reap the benefit of financial liberalization on their output 
volatility. Having a deeper credit market, more open capital markets, and a 
developed stock market can also reduce output volatility. In particular, having 
a developed stock market complements bank lending from abroad in reducing 
output volatility.
(iii)   Improving access to international capital markets. This would obviate the 
need for countries with managed exchange rate regimes to maintain high levels 
of foreign reserves to mitigate output volatility and to insure against negative 
shocks. In the meantime, formalizing regional and international cooperation 
would help to improve access to liquidity when immediate needs arise. 
Temporary actions, such as establishment of bilateral swap arrangement with 
the Federal Reserve and cooperative initiatives for bilateral swaps among Asian 
countries proved to be useful over the years. Creating a multilateral reserve 
pool under the Chiang Mai Initiative could also mitigate the shortages in US 
dollar, and would reduce the need to accumulate excessive reserves. This 
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policy will allow a country to gradually pursue a more flexible exchange rate 
with less concern for negative external shocks.
(iv)   Developing a local currency bond market. Foreign reserves management 
has been conservative in developing Asia partly because liquidity needs are 
overemphasized, and largely because of the limited development of national 
and regional securities markets. A local currency bond market, in particular, 
needs to be developed further both in size and accessibility for developing Asia 
to diversify its assets and to avoid overexposure to US dollar–denominated 
assets. Developed local currency bond market would also address the currency 
mismatch problem of developing Asia that has arguably caused the excessive 
holding of foreign reserves.
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Appendix 
Appendix 1:  List of Economies in the Sample 
Industrialized countries:
Australia*, Austria*, Belgium*, Canada*, Denmark*, Finland*, France*, Germany*, Greece*, 
Iceland*, Ireland*, Italy*, Japan*, Malta*, Netherlands, The*, New Zealand*, Norway*, Portugal*, 
Spain*, Sweden*, Switzerland*, United Kingdom*
Developing Countries:
Less integrated country:
Albania*, Algeria, Angola*, Antigua and Barbuda*, Armenia*, Aruba*, Azerbaijan*, Bahamas, 
The* Bahrain*, Bangladesh, Barbados*, Belarus*, Belize, Benin, Bhutan*, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic Chad*, Comoros*, Congo, Rep., Costa Rica, 
Croatia*, Cyprus*, Djibouti*, Dominica*, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, 
Estonia*, Ethiopia, Fiji Islands, Gabon, Gambia, The, Georgia*, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, 
Republic of*, Guinea-Bissau*, Guyana*, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Islamic Rep.*, Kazakhstan*, 
Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic*, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia*, Lebanon*, Lesotho, 
Liberia*, Libya*, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives*, Mali, Mauritania, Micronesia, Fed. States of*, 
Moldova*, Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar*, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, 
Panama, Papua New Guinea*, Paraguay, Qatar*, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe*, Samoa*, 
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles*, Sierra Leone*, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadine, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Tonga*, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine*, Uruguay, Venezuela, RB, Viet Nam, Zimbabwe, Chile, 
People’s Republic of China, Colombia, Czech Republic*
Highly integrated country:
Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria*, Cote d’Ivoire, Cambodia, Ecuador, Egypt, Arab Rep., 
Ghana, Hong Kong, China, Hungary, India, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Rep. of, 
Lithuania*, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria*, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Russian Federation*, Singapore, Slovak Republic*, Slovenia*, South Africa, Taipei,China, 
Tajikistan*, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen, Rep.*, Zambia.
Note: * - not included in the regression estimations
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Appendix 2: Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Flows  
to Highly Integrated Asian Economies
To examine the determinants of FDI flows to highly integrated Asian economies, we employ the 
gravity model and use the data of bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. We augment 
the basic gravity model with other determinants, which theory predicts should affect the choice of 
location of FDI. Specifically, the empirical model takes the form of Equation (A1).    
FDI M M Distance BIMP ITT Res Uij i j ij ij j j= + + + + + + +β β β β β β β β0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 LC
HC RER REER MS FO IN
j
j ij j j j           + + + + + +β β β β β β8 9 10 11 12 13 FRA TB
NTB RTAs BTAs
j j
j j ij ij
+
+ + + +
β
β β β ν
14
           15 16 17  (A1)
where 
FDIij is the real FDI flows from source country i to host country j (as a percentage of GDP)
Mi and Mj is the market size of home country i and host country j (real GDP per capita, constant 
2000 US$)
Distanceij is the geographical distance between source country i and host country j (kilometers)
BIMPij is the share of (lag) bilateral imports of parts and components of home country i from the 
host country j in total imports of country i (percent)1
ITTj is the intra-industry trade of parts and components in host country j (index: 0-1)
Resj is the share of crude material (SITC2) and fuels (SITC3) exports of host country j in world 
total crude and fuel exports (percent)
ULCj is unit labor costs, measured by value-added in host country j (constant 2000 US$/worker)
HCj is the measure of human capital, measured by UNDP education index, in host country j 
(index: 0-1)
RERij is the bilateral real exchange rate between source country i and host country j (index: 
2000=100)
REERj is the real effective exchange rate in host country j (with its key trading partners) (index: 
2000=100)
MSj is the measure for macroeconomic stability (the weighted average of money [M2] growth, 
inflation, and standard deviation of inflation) in host country j (index: 1-10, higher values 
indicate greater the macroeconomic stability) 
 The lag variable is included here as argued that the existing market of parts and components in the home country 
could further promote FDI in the following period (Milner et al. 200).
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FOj is the financial openness measure (foreign ownership and/or investment restriction and capital 
controls) in host country j (index: 1-10, higher values indicate greater the financial openness 
[de jure measure]) 
INFRAj is the measure of infrastructure development (percentage of paved road to total road) in 
host country j (percent)
TBj is the measure of tariff barriers (revenues from trade taxes (percent of total trade), mean tariff 
rate, and standard deviation of tariff rate) in host country j (index: 1-10, higher values indicate 
lower tariff barriers, i.e., greater trade openness)
NTBj is the measure of nontariff barriers (level of nontariff barriers and compliance costs of 
importing and exporting) in host country j (index: 1-10; the higher the index, the lower the 
nontariff barriers)
RTAsj is the dummy variables for participation by host country j in regional trade agreements. 
There are three dummy variables: (1) the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) (1 for country 
participating in APTA and 0 otherwise); (2) the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) (1 for ASEAN 
Free Trade Area and 0 otherwise); and (3) ASEAN-other nonmember countries (AFTAHub)  
(1 for country outside ASEAN that signed the agreement with AFTA and 0 otherwise).
BTAsij is the dummy variables for the presence of bilateral trade agreements signed between 
home country i and host country j.
All the variables except for indexes are included as natural logarithm.         
The bilateral FDI data are extracted from the UNCTAD/TNC database for the period 1994–2007. 
Eight highly integrated Asian economies (People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; India; 
Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; Thailand) are the host countries, i.e., 
FDI recipient countries. Sixty-one home (FDI-provider) countries comprise both developed and 
developing countries including the host countries.22  The FDI data are deflated by the consumer 
price index of the host country. Note that data relating to macroeconomic stability, financial 
openness, tariff barriers and nontariff barriers are from Fraser Institute (see www.freetheworld.
com/release.html).
The original unbalanced annual dataset is organized into five nonoverlapping 3-year panels for the 
period of 1994–2007 (except for the last panel for which the data are averaged over the 2-year 
period). Sampling 3-year averages should mitigate the effect of business cycle fluctuations. The 
dataset contains a large number of missing variables and a small number of disinvestment figures 
that appear as negative figures in the dataset. Excluding missing and negative observations 
reduces the number of panel observations from 3,240 to 1,024. To deal with the issue of censored 
data, the Tobit model (truncated regression model) is applied (Stein and Daude 2006 and 
Loungani et al. 2002). The unit root tests are first performed to ensure that there is no unit root 
2 Based on data availability, the 6 home countries are composed of Afghanistan; Argentina; Australia; Austria; 
Bahrain; Bangladesh; Belgium; Brazil; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile; People’s Republic of China; Colombia; 
Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Fiji; Finland; France; Georgia; Germany; Greece; Hong Kong, China; Hungary; 
Iceland; India; Indonesia; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Japan; Kazakhstan; Republic of Korea; Kuwait; Luxembourg; Malaysia; 
Mexico; Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Pakistan; Papua New Guinea; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; 
Russian Federation; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sweden; Switzerland; Thailand; Turkey; 
United Kingdom; United States; Vanuatu; Venezuela; and Viet Nam. 
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for all dependent and independent variables. Because no unit root is found, both dependent and 
independent variables can be used without concerns of spurious regression.  
The estimation results are reported in Table A2.1. The growth impact of the G3 countries can be 
found as the statistically significant interaction terms between the variable for real income per 
capita income (Mi) and the dummy for the G3 countries. The regression results indicate that the 
output performance of both home and host countries positively affects FDI inflows to the Asian 
region. As shown in column C of the table, a 1.0% drop in the real income growth of the G3 
countries could cause a decline in FDI inflows to highly integrated Asian economies by 1.5%.33 
The host country-specific factors, however, are still found to be more significant determinants of 
FDI inflows than those of the G3 countries. The low labor costs, real currency competitiveness, 
human capital development, and good business environment, especially in terms of trade and 
financial openness, are found to promote inward FDI in the region. 
 The impact of real income per capita of the G countries is derived from the coefficients corresponding to the 
per capita real income variable of home country i (Mi) and the interaction term between Mi and the G dummy 
(Mi*dummyG), i.e. .5 = 0.8 + 0.66 (see column C in Table A2.).
What Makes Developing Asia Resilient in a Financially Globalized World?  | 39
Continued.
Table A2.1: Estimation Results
Dependent Variable = FDI Inflows Column A Column B Column C
Market size of home country (Mi) .7 .2 0.8
(8.66)* (7.22)* (0.67)*
Market size of host country (Mj^2) 0.07 0.08 0.07
(2.29)* (2.96)* (2.5)*
Distance (Distanceij) −0.7 −0.67 −0.85
(−5.5)* (−5.6)* (−5.7)*
(lag) bilateral imports of parts and 
components of i from j (BIMPij)
0.7 0.7 0.60
(9.89)* (0.)* (.8)*
Intra-industry trade (IITj^2) 0.8 .22 .50
(.)*** (2.02)* (2.67)*
Unit labor costs (ULCj) −.72 −.78 −.58
(−.55)* (−.98)* (−.67)*
Human capital (HCj^2) 2.87 .8 2.6
(6.28)* (7.0)* (6.87)*
Natural Resources (Resj^2) 0. 0. 0.28
(.66)** (.86)** (.59)**
Bilateral RER (RERij) −0.
(−0.2)
Real effective exchange rate (REERj) .6 2.9 .0
(.6)* (.5)* (.06)*
Macroeconomic stability (MSj) 0.9
(0.28)
Financial openness (FOj) . .5 .
(.75)* (.22)* (.6)*
Infrastructure (INFRAj) 2.28 2.8 2.2
(.06)* (.7)* (.0)*
Tariff barriers (TBj) 0.85 0.97
(2.9)*
0.77
(2.06)*(2.08)*
Nontariff barriers (NTBj) .55 .06 .8
(.77)** (0.99) (.65)**
Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) 0.6
(0.9)
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) −0.
(−0.80)
ASEAN-other nonmember countries 
(AFTAhub)
0.56
(.7)***
Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTAij) 0.6 0.70 0.6
(.92)* (2.2)* (.82)**
Asian Crisis Dummy 997–999 .8
(dum9799) (0.65)
Mi*dum9799 −0.0
(−0.5)
After Asian Crisis Dummy −0.
2000–2007 (dumaftercrisis) (−0.09)
Mi*dumaftercrisis 0.0
(0.27)
Mi*dummG 0.66
(.99)*
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Table A2.1: Continued.
IITj^2*dummyG .5
(2.7)*
BIMPij*dumG 0.26
(.9)**
Distanceij*dumG −0.5
(−2.80)*
No. Observations 00 02 02
Standard errors of regression 2. 2.6 2.0
* = % significance, ** = 5% significance, and *** = 0% significance.
Note:  All variables except for the indexes are in natural logarithm; t-statistics in brackets.  “dum9799” is the dummy that takes the 
value of  during 997–999, and zero otherwise. “dumaftercrisis” is the dummy variable to account for the post-Asian crisis 
years.  The intercept is included in the estimations, but its estimates are not reported.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
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Appendix 3: Determinants of Portfolio Investment and Bank Lending 
Flows in Highly Integrated Asian Economies
We examine the determinants of portfolio investment and banking lending flows to highly 
integrated Asian economies by using the empirical models that incorporate economic performance 
of key trading partners; economic fundamentals of the host countries; returns on investment, 
as well as institutional environment of the host countries such as financial openness. In this 
investigation, the empirical model is applied to both portfolio investment flows and bank loans, 
and also to both inflows and outflows thereof to add more nuance to the analysis. The estimation 
model is specified as Equation (A2.1).
OCFj = α0 +  α1*GDPGj  +  α2*G3GDP  +  α3*G3GDPG  + α4*TPRGDP +  α5*TPRGDPG  
  +  α6* RSHDiff  +  α7*FOj  +  α8* Sharej  + α9* ISj   + vj        (A2.1)
where
OCFj   = inflows/outflows of portfolio investment flows or bank loans of host country j as 
  a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) 
GDPGj  =  GDP growth rate of host country j 
G3GDP  = per capita real GDP of the G3 countries (constant 2000 US$)
G3GDPG  = GDP growth rate of the G3 countries (percent)
TPRGDP =  per capita real GDP level of key trading partner within the region1  
  (constant 2000 US$)
TPRGDPG =  GDP growth rate of key trading partner within the region (percent)
RSHDiff   =  real interest rate differential (differences between real short-term interest 
  rates of host country j and G3 countries adjusted by the expected depreciation 
  of the weighted exchange rate, proxied by the first lag of the rate of 
  depreciation) (percent)
FOj       = financial openness of host country j (foreign ownership/investment restriction 
  and capital controls) (index: 1-10; the higher the index, the greater the financial 
  openness (de jure measure))  
Sharej = share prices index of host country j
ISj = ratio of investment (gross fixed capital formation) to gross domestic savings 
  of host country j 
Unlike in the estimation model for FDI flows, because bilateral flow data for portfolio investment 
and bank loans are quite limited, we use the data from the Balance of Payments published by the 
 Key trading partners within the region are composed of PRC; Hong Kong, China; Korea; Malaysia; India; Indonesia; 
Philippines; Singapore; and Thailand but the weight of each country varies from country to country.
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IMF.2 The original dataset is for the period 1990–2008. Also, we do not use 3-year panels for the 
estimation, but instead use annual data, hoping to capture the short-term dynamics of these types 
of capital flows. For the same reason as in the estimations on FDI flows, we use the Tobit model. 
Because the simultaneity bias can arise with the GDP growth of host countries, we employ the 
two-stage least square method and instrument it with first lags of GDP growth rates. The unit root 
tests ensure no unit root for all dependent and independent variables. All variables are extracted 
from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF and the CEIC database while the variable for 
financial openness is from Fraser Institute (see www.freetheworld.com/dtasets_efw.html).
The regression results for the estimation on the inflows of portfolio investment and bank loans are 
reported in Table A3.1 and those on the outflows in Table A3.2. The models in Column (A) interact 
all explanatory variables with two dummies, one for the pre-Asian crisis period and the other for 
the during-the-crisis period to examine if the impacts of these variables have changed over time.3 
Column (B) reports only the variables that are statistically significant, and column (C) provides 
the estimation results based on the generalized moments of method (GMM).42 While the results 
appear rather similar between columns (B) and (C) in terms of the statistical significance and the 
magnitude of the coefficients of the variables of our interest, our discussions on the estimation 
results focus on those in column (B). Except for the GMM estimations, we use the Huber-White 
robust standard errors to account for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. 
The estimation results show that the G3 countries’ GDP significantly affects the portfolio and bank 
loan inflows to highly integrated Asian economies; a 1.00% increase in the G3 countries’ GDP 
would lead to a 5.73% increase in bank loans inflows while portfolio inflows would increase by 
5.34%. We also find that the financial crises do not affect this relationship. The output performance 
of key trading partners in the region is also found to significantly affect both portfolio and bank loan 
flows to the region. However, the coefficients corresponding to this variable are much smaller than 
those of the G3 GDP growth rates and they are significant only for the portfolio regressions. This 
finding reflects the tendency that investors outside the Asian region, especially those from the G3 
countries, are crucial players in affecting capital flows in the form of portfolio investment or bank 
lending. This is consistent with the fact that intraregional capital flows are limited, though they are 
gradually trending upward. Thus, it is not surprising that the recent global crisis has resulted in a 
significant pullback of short-term capital flows.
2 The Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey from the IMF reports bilateral flows in equity and debt securities but 
only for 997 and 200–2007. 
 The dummy for the current global crisis is also included in the model and interacted with the explanatory 
variables. But the level and slope dummies turn out to be statistically insignificant both individually and jointly.
 Note that in the regression for portfolio inflows, the first lag of GDP growth, instead of contemporaneous one, of 
the host country is included so that the simultaneity problem between portfolio inflows and GDP growth can be 
mitigated. Therefore, column (c), which is supposed to report estimation results based on the GMM model,  is not 
presented for the portfolio inflow regressions, only the Tobit estimation results are reported.
What Makes Developing Asia Resilient in a Financially Globalized World?  | 43
Table A3.1: Estimation Results on Capital Inflows
Dependent Variables Portfolio Inflows Bank Loans Inflows
Column (A) Column (B) Column (A) Column (B) Column (C)
Real GDP level of G 
  countries (G3GDP)
6.
(2.0)**
5.6
(2.6)**
9.9
(.55)***
5.7
(2.27)**
9.28
(2.5)**
Real GDP of key trading 
  partners (TPRGDP)
2.8
(2.5)**
.
(2.50)**
Real GDP growth of key 
  trading partners (TPRGDPG)
−0.05
(−0.7)
Real GDP growth of host 
  country j(GDPGj)
0.6
(2.05)**
0.07
(2.2)**
0.57
(2.8)*
0.26
(2.60)*
0.6
(.88)***
GDPGj^2 −0.0
(−.5)*
Financial openness (FOj) 2.
(.2)*
.05
(2.89)*
7.
(.0)*
.02
(2.88)*
.95
(.0)
Share of investment over 
  savings (ISj)
−0.97
(−.02)
−2.0
(−2.82)*
−0.75
(−0.)
−2.6
(−2.02)**
−2.8
(−.90)**
Real interest rate differential 
  (RSHDiff)
0.06
(.6)***
0.0
(.0)*
−0.0
(−0.2)
0.000
(.67)***
0.000
(.85)***
Share prices index (Sharej) −.89
(−2.8)**
−2.
(−.)
G3GDP*dumbefore −0.7
(−0.90)
−0.88
(−0.80)
TPRGDP*dumbefore −0.02
(−0.0)
TPRGDPG*dumbefore 0.7
(0.65)
GDPGj*dumbefore −0.
(−.7)*
−0.59
(−.9)***
FOj*dumbefore −2.0
(−2.6)*
−6.9
(−2.8)*
ISj*dumbefore −0.56
(−0.28)
.7
(2.9)**
−.78
(−0.2)
0.52
(2.72)*
8.5
(2.5)**
RSHDiff*dumbefore −0.06
(−.2)
0.0
(0.2)
Sharej*dumbefore 2.9
(.66)*
0.
(.20)*
.7
(2.20)**
0.50
(2.9)*
0.60
(.65)***
G3GDP*dumbcrisis −0.6
(−0.50)
.00
(0.7)
TPRGDP*dumcrisis −.8
(−.05)
TPRGDPG*dumcrisis 0.2
(0.8)
GDPGj*dumcrisis −0.09
(−0.98)
−0.
(−0.)
FOj*dumcrisis −.99
(−.76)
−2.77
(−0.90)
ISj*dumcrisis −2.7
(−.0)
8.2
(.8)
8.05
(2.0)**
Continued.
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RSHDiff*dumcrisis −0.05
(−.)
−0.007
(−0.07)
Sharej*dumcrisis .22
(.0)
.87
(2.6)**
−0.89
(−0.22)
No. of observations 7 7 55 55 55
Adjusted R2  
  (mean dependent variable)
0.88 (.88) 0.87 (0.55) 0.75
Standard errors of regression .66 .75 .8 . 5.98
* = % significance, ** = 5% significance and *** = 0% significance.
Note:  t-statistics are in brackets. Except for the variables for GDP growth rates of host countries or trade partners (TPRGDPG and 
GDPGj) and real interest rate differentials (RSHDiff), all variables are measured in natural logarithm. Because the regressions 
on portfolio inflows include the GDP growth rates of host countries as the first lagged values, the results from the GMM 
estimation are not reported. “Dumbefore” is the dummy variable for the period 990–996 while “Dumcris” is for the years 
during the crisis, i.e., 997–999.  
Source:  Authors’ estimates.
In the estimation on the outflows of portfolio investment and bank lending (Table A3.2), the 
G3 GDP is again found to positively affect these types of capital flows. A 1.00% rise in the 
G3 countries’ GDP increases portfolio outflows by 8.57% and bank loans outflows by 5.17%, 
respectively, from highly integrated Asian economies. This result explains that the collapse of 
the G3 economies in response to the global financial crisis has resulted in a decline of capital 
outflows from the region. Consistent with the estimation results on the capital inflows, key trading 
partners’ GDP growth in the region seems to have only a limited effect on the outflows of portfolio 
investment and bank loans, and the statistical significance is found only for bank loans. A 1.00% 
rise in key trading partners’ GDP growth would lead to a rise in bank loan outflows by 0.35%. 
Table A3.1: Continued.
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Continued.
Table A4.2: Estimation Results on Capital Outflows
Dependent Variables Portfolio Outflows Bank Loans Outflows
Column (A) Column (B) Column (C) Column (A) Column (B) Column (C)
Real GDP level of G countries 
  (G3GDP)
7.97
(.5)
8.57
(2.6)*
8.
(.90)**
7.55
(.6)
5.7
(2.2)**
5.77
(.65)***
Real GDP growth of key 
  trading partners (TPRGDPG)
−0.69
(−2.5)*
0.7
(.65)
0.5
(2.9)*
0.
(.87)**
Real GDP growth of host 
  country j (GDPGj)
0.5
(.96)**
0.7
(2.0)*
0.5
(.0)***
0.79
(2.)**
GDPGj^2 0.0
(.6)***
0.0
(0.92)
Financial openness (FOj) 6.57
(2.26)*
.5
(0.8)*
.8
(.)*
2.86
(2.00)
.7
(.70)**
.58
(.6)***
Share of investment over 
savings (ISj)
−0.50
(−0.25)
−2.
(−.60)***
−2.2
(−.20)***
−.
(−0.70)
−2.2
(−.7)**
−.02
(−2.05)**
Real interest rate differential 
(RSHDiff)
0.0
(.)
−0.02
(−0.25)
−0.06
(−.0)***
−0.22
(−2.76)*
RSHDiff^2 −0.002
(−.)*
−0.002
(−.62)***
Share prices index (Sharej) −2.62
(−.75)***
−.
(−2.)**
−.9
(−.65)***
−.75
(−.7)
G3GDP*dumbefore −.7
(−.)
−0.
(−0.2)
TPRGDPG*dumbefore .7
(2.2)**
.75
(5.27)*
.82
(5.60)*
−0.02
(−0.0)
GDPGj*dumbefore −0.2
(−.55)***
−0.66
(−.)
FOj*dumbefore −5.2
(−7.06)*
−9.76
(−5.98)*
−0.7
(-5.9)*
−2.60
(−.7)
ISj*dumbefore −.77
(−2.7)*
−0.99
(−0.20)
RSHDiff*dumbefore −0.
(−.27)
−0.0
(−0.20)
Sharej*dumbefore 5.7
(2.89)*
2.
(.)
G3GDP*dumbcrisis −.
(−0.67)
2.6
(0.28)
TPRGDPG*dumcrisis 0.87
(2.0)*
−0.29
(−0.77)
GDPGj*dumcrisis −0.29
(−0.85)
−0.09
(−0.27)
FOj*dumcrisis 2.70
(0.7)
−.2
(−0.58)
ISj*dumcrisis −.2
(−0.22)
−6.8
(−0.95)
RSHDiff*dumcrisis −0.6
(−.2)
−0.
(−0.79)
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Sharej*dumcrisis −0.9
(−0.)
.0
(.05)
No. of observations 28 28 28 5 5 5
Adjusted R2 
  (mean dependent variable)
0.76 (.95) 0.70 0.86 0.7 0.79
Standard error of regression .52 .0 .02 .66 .62 .52
* = % significance, ** = 5% significance and *** = 0% significance. 
Note: t-statistics are in brackets. Except for the variables for GDP growth rates of host countries or trade partners (TPRGDPG and 
GDPGj) and real interest rate differentials (RSHDiff), all variables are measured in natural logarithm. “Dumbefore” is the 
dummy variable for the period 990–996 while “Dumcris” is for the years during the crisis, i.e., 997–999.  
Source:  Authors’ estimates.
Table A4.2: Continued.
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